Many investigators have challenged people's abilities either to make accurate and subtle social judgments or to be aware of their own shortcomings. For example, person-perception research suggests that judgments and descriptions of other,people are based not on the targets being described but on the judges' implicit theories of personality (Chapman & Chapman, 1969; Dornbusch, Hastorf, Richardson, Muzzy, & Vreeland, 1965; Passini & Norman, 1966) . Similarly, D'Andrade (1974) has argued that memories of others are also based on implicit theories of which characteristics go with which. Simple characteristics, like physical attrac-tiveness (e.g., Bersheid & Walster, 1974) or talkativeness (Hayes & Meltzer, 1972) , can activate these implicit theories and lead to elaborate and differentiated descriptions of people. Despite the simplicity with which many judgments of people can be modeled (e.g;, Dawes, 1979) , as person perceivers we persist in believing that our judgments are complex and configural.
Consistent with this general skepticism about our abilities as social cognizers, Nisbett and his .colleagues (e.g., Nisbett & Bellows, 1977; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) claim that people are unable to report directly and accurately on their higher order cognitive processes. Characteristics of a stimulus often influence a person's beliefs, decisions, and behavior. But according to Nisbett and Wilson, people cannot assess the impact of the stimulus by referring to the underlying cognitive processes by which they formed the belief, decision, or behavior. When they answer questions such as, Why do you like him? or What made you think that she was intelligent? they rely on a priori or ad hoc implicit theories of liking or intelligence rather than on an introspective examination of the decision process itself. These implicit theories would allow outside observers who had never engaged in the behavior or made the decision to generate the same explanations as the actor. Thus, Nisbett would deny that occasions of vivid and accurate self-awareness are valid counterevidence and would dismiss them as unreliable or as the accidental result of the introspector's use of a correct but public, causal theory to explain his or her actions or decisions.
These are provocative claims. Most researchers would agree that people are not completely aware of the influences on their social judgments. Why do we perform social science research if not to discover the subtle influences on behavior that people cannot report? But Nisbett and Wilson (1977) go well beyond this and argue in favor of a total lack of self-awareness. "The evidence reviewed is then consistent with the most pessimistic view concerning people's ability to report accurately about their cognitive processes" (p. 247). "People have little ability to report accurately on their cognitive processed" (p. 246).
Nisbett and Wilson review an eclectic assortment of evidence to support their claim that people are unaware of the influences on their own behavior. Some of the research (e.g., subliminal perception and learning without awareness) is about atypical behavior at the limits of human performance, and yet it is treated as if it were typical. In much of the research, the original researchers were not interested in and did not try to find evidence of introspective awareness.
Most of the research that explicitly addresses the question of introspective awareness is seriously flawed. We will discuss Nisbett and Bellows' research (1977) here in some detail because it illustrates several of the flaws that permeate much of this research. Nisbett and Bellows asked whether person perceivers were aware of the influences on their judgments. Subjects read one job application and judged the candidate's likability, sympathy, flexibility, and intelligence. Across subjects the job descriptions varied on whether five factors were mentioned: (a) physical attractiveness, (b) academic credentials, (c) a pratfall, (d) a serious accident, and (e) subjects' future contact with the candidate. Through group comparisons, Nisbett and Bellows determined how each factor influenced the four judgments that subjects made of the candidate. Subjects themselves estimated how much impact each factor had on their judgments. Finally observer subjects who did not read the descriptions or make judgments of the candidates estimated how each of the five factors would influence the judgments.
Nisbett and Bellows found that groups of subjects who were influenced by the manipulated factors did not accurately report on that influence for three of the four judgments they made. For the intelligence judgment, the judges were accurate, but observer subjects were equally accurate, even though they made no intelligence judgments. Nisbett and Bellows concluded that person-perception judges have little self-awareness.
We doubt their conclusion for several reasons. The most important criticism is that the data from this and other studies conducted by Nisbett and his colleagues, which used between-subject designs, are irrelevant to questions of self-awareness. The selfawareness question is one about an individual: How accurate is he or she at assessing the influences on his or her beliefs, decisions, or behavior? This question cannot be answered by showing that a group member identifies or fails to identify the factors that influence the group (Smith & Miller, 1978; White, 1980) . In respo'nse to this problem, we examined self-awareness by comparing the influences on a single person's social decisions with that person's awareness of them.
Even if one were to accept the relevance of between-subject data to assess a withinsubject hypothesis, the data that Nisbett and Bellows present are a weak test of their hypothesis. The variables that they manipulated had only small influences on subjects' person-perception judgments. For example, the main effects of their five manipulations explain less than 3% of the variance in the mean of subjects' liking judgments and less than 5% of the variance in the sympathy judgments. Even the anticipated meeting manipulation, which Nisbett and Bellows claim had a "very great" impact on the flexibility judgment, corresponds to a correlation of approximately .33, which accounts for about 10% of the variance in this judgment. Because of this, Nisbett and Bellows may have shown only that when experimenters ask subjects about trivial and possibly random influences and ignore major ones, subjects cannot tell which of these trivial influences was most important.
In general, research that has shown subjects' lack of self-awareness has asked them about minor influences on their behavior but does not allow them to report on more important influences. Thus, to study selfawareness, researchers must be convinced that they themselves can identify or estimate the important influences on their subjects' beliefs, decisions, and behavior. Traditional social-psychological manipulations, which often have small, albeit reliable, effects on behavior, are unlikely candidates.
A third criticism is that many instances of what appears to be lack of self-awareness may instead be memory failures for parts of a cognitive process of which subjects were once vividly aware. Memory failure for cognitive processes is especially likely to occur in the paradigms examined by Nisbett and Wilson in which subjects were not forewarned that they were to report on their thoughts and therefore had no incentive to remember them. To meet this criticism, our research first directed subjects' attention to the cognitive processes of interest and then manipulated a delay before they reported on their introspections so that the influence of memory decay could be examined.
Overview
The goal of the present research is to examine, in light of these criticisms, whether people are aware of their social-cognitive processes. Our first step was to test Nisbett and Wilson's null hypothesis. We asked, as they did, whether judges were self-aware and whether this self-awareness could be accounted for by a priori causal theories. We were interested in how much judges are aware of what influenced their judgments and what factors mediated their awareness.
We studied these questions in the context of a realistic social-perception task. Subjects watched brief videotaped interviews and then evaluated the interviewees on one of three dimensions: intelligence, friendliness, or deceptiveness. We used ratings of intelligence and friendliness as judgment tasks because these are two basic dimensions of person perception (Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968) . Ratings of deceptiveness were used because they were especially appropriate to our videotaped materials (interviews between a U.S. Customs inspector and travelers).
We chose a mundane social-perception task because we believed it was typical of the social decisions people often make. This is in contrast to Nisbett and Wilson (1977) who selected unusual tasks and purposely confusing experimental manipulations to influence subjects: "the stimulus situations were chosen in large part because we felt that subjects would be wrong about the effects of the stimuli on their responses" (p. 242). In addition our stimuli, with their wide and yet natural variation in and covariation among travelers' demographic characteristics and behaviors, are richer and more ecologically valid than the factorially designed paragraphs used by White (1980) . The use of our stimuli would not highlight through extremity or repetition the variables about which perceivers' self-awareness would be assessed.
So that we could assess the impact of the travelers' behavior and demographic characteristics on each judge's judgments, they each evaluated a large number of travelers. Each judge's judgments were correlated with the travelers' characteristics to assess the impact of these characteristics on the judgments. Each judge then estimated how these characteristics had influenced him or her. Observer subjects who did not see interviews or make person-perception judgments estimated how these characteristics would have influenced them had they made judgments. The partial correlation for each judge of the actual effects of the stimulus characteristics with the judge's estimate of the effects, holding constant observer subjects' estimate of the effects, is a minimum estimate of that subject 1 s self-awareness, even holding constant a priori causal theories.
Methods

Stimulus Materials and Person Perception Judgments
Judges watched an hour-long videotape containing brief U.S. Customs interrogations with 50 travelers and made a person-perception judgment after each interrogation they saw. The details of the interviews and the videotape are described in Kraut and Poe (1980) . Briefly, volunteer airline passengers were questioned by a uniformed U.S. Customs inspector who asked about the travelers' citizenship, home residence, length of trip, purpose of trip, occupation, and purchases. The travelers varied widely in age, social class, and behavior. Two counterbalanced orders of the tape were used.
Ninety-six judges made one of three judgments immediately after viewing the interrogation of each traveler. The judges were college students who were paid $5 for 2 hours' participation. One third of the judges rated the travelers' intelligence, one third rated their friendliness, and one third rated their deceptiveness, all on 6-point scales ranging from less than average to more than average compared to the other travelers they had seen. They were instructed to attend to the influences on their judgments. "As you do this task, you should also pay attention to what factors you think are influencing your judgments. In the second part of the study, we will ask you to rate a number of the dimensions on which the travelers vary for their influence on your judgments." The categories of demographic characteristics and nonverbal behavior were mentioned for illustration, but judges were not told on which dimensions they would be tested. This forewarning is a change from Nisbett and Bellows' (1977) procedure, but it is appropriate for a strong test of the null hypothesis that judges have no self-awareness.
Actual Impact
The travelers' characteristics and behaviors were rated by expert coders or measured objectively for each of 18 dimensions listed in Table 1 . Most of the operational definitions for this coding are presented in Kraut and Poe (1980) . The others are presented here. Attractiveness was judged from the video portion of the videotapes by four coders (reliability r = .77). Speech rate is the speed in number of words per minute of a traveler's answers. Formality of prose is the degree to which a traveler uses formal language, complete sentences, and good syntax and vocabulary, judged by five coders from transcripts (reliability r = .83), standardized, and then averaged with the standardized number of speech errors, as described in Kraut and Poe (1980) . Height was measured from the video image.
One can compute 18 correlations for each judge (each correlation based on an N of 50 travelers), which represent the impact of the 18 dimensions on that judge's person-perception judgments. For example, the impact of eye contact on a judge's intelligence judgments would be the correlation between travelers' level of eye contact and the intelligence judgments made of them. To measure actual impact, we used a zero-order correlation rather than a partial correlation or regression weight that would have held 17 other variables constant. The reasons we used a zero-order correlation measure were because we believed that naive subjects do not work well with covariation information (Ross, 1977) and that judges themselves do not hold variables constant when they are being influenced by a stimulus. For example, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) reviewed studies that manipulated the redundancies between social judgment cues and concluded, "subjects' beta weights match the cue-criterion correlations rather than the cue-criterion beta weights. Thus subjects fail to take appropriate account of redundancies" (p. 709).
Subjective Impact
After judges rated all 50 travelers, they estimated the impact that each of the 18 traveler characteristics had on their ratings. Travelers had already been measured on these characteristics. The dimensions, which were described to judges, resembled as closely as possible the operational definitions by which they had previously been measured. Judges made their estimates of subjective impact on 13-point scales. A 0 meant that the characteristic or the behavior had no influence on the judgment. A +6 meant that when the traveler showed more of the characteristic or performed more of the behavior, the judge thought that the traveler was more intelligent, friendly, or deceptive. Finally, a -6 meant that when the traveler showed more of the characteristic or performed more of the behavior, the judge thought that the traveler was less intelligent, friendly, or deceptive.
We urged judges to strive for accurate estimates of impact and to forego face-saving claims that they were influenced only by relevant and socially desirable characteristics.
We have had the videotapes coded for about two dozen dimensions and for each, you will be asked to indicate the way this factor influenced your judgments. . . . People are often reluctant to admit being influenced by things that they consider illogical or unreasonable.. . . We would like you to try to report accurately the influence of the different factors on your judgments even when common sense might suggest that a given factor should be irrelevant.
Half of the subjects made their estimates of subjective impact immediately after rating all of the travelers, and half made their estimates after performing a half-hour intervening task. We believed that the delayed report would be less accurate than the immediate one (cf. White, 1980) . For the intervening task, subjects were given brief descriptions of 10 travelers and were asked to recall 10 characteristics or behaviors for each. This task was designed to examine some sources of influence on person memory and will be reported in a later paper.
Lay Theories of Causation
Following Nisbett and Bellows' (1977) logic, we had observer subjects estimate how much each of the trav-eler characteristics would have influenced them if they had seen the travelers and had made person-perception judgments of them. Eighteen observer subjects were treated as judges until they reached the point when they would have seen the videotapes and made judgments of travelers. Then they were given a complete description of how the videotape had been made and the typical interview sequence they would have seen. The variability in travelers' demographic characteristics and behaviors was stressed.
The observers' task was to fill out the same subjective impact questionnaire that judges had completed and to indicate how the travelers' characteristics would have influenced them. They received identical instructions and were also urged to ignore social desirability when they predicted what would have influenced them. Each observer did this for two of the three person-perception judgments in counterbalanced order. Thus, each lay theory estimate of impact is the mean of 12 observers' estimates.
Dependent Measures
In summary, we have three primary sources of data: first, the actual impact of stimulus characteristics on each judge's person-perception judgments in the form of 18 correlations for each judge; second, each judge's estimates of the subjective impact of the 18 stimulus characteristics; and third, the observers' estimates of the impact of the 18 stimulus characteristics.
From these primary measures, we computed four derived measures to estimate each subject's accuracy at assessing the influences on his or her person-perception judgments. First, the correlation for each subject between the actual impact and the subjective impact of cues (based on an TV of 18 stimulus characteristics) indicates how well a subject's self-reports correspond to the actual influences on his or her judgments. We will refer to this as the self-awareness correlation. Second, the correlation for each subject between the subjective impact of cues and the observers' guesses about the impact of these cues is an estimate of how well the lay theories can account for that judge's self-awareness. Third, the correlation between the observers' guesses about the impact of the cues and the actual impact on a judge is an estimate of the accuracy of the lay theories for that judge.
Finally, from these three correlations, we computed for each judge a partial correlation of the actual impact of the cues with their subjective impact and held constant the lay theories. This is an estimate of a judge's self-awareness about the impact of stimulus characteristics on his or her person-perception judgments over and above that which could have been known in advance from lay theories of causation. We will refer to this as the self-awareness partial correlation.
Results and Discussion
Impact of Stimulus Characteristics on Person-Perception Judgments
To examine whether judges are aware of the influences on their judgments, we as researchers must be assured that we are asking them about the correct variables. To determine this, we regressed the 18 stimulus characteristics we had studied with each judge's person-perception judgments (N -50 judgments). The regression equation was significant for 55 of the 96 judges. The R 2 , or variance explained for each judge, is an estimate of the predictability of his or her judgments from the stimulus characteristics. The mean R 2 for all judges was .55, being .52 for intelligence judgments, .63 for friendliness judgments, and .49 for deceptiveness judgments. Thus, we have selected stimulus characteristics that had substantial influences on most of the judges' person-perception judgments.
1
The impact of the 18 cues on the personperception judgments is shown in Table 1 . Judgments of friendliness were overwhelming, based on the amount the targets smiled (mean r = .53) and the amount of information they volunteered (mean r = .43), which may be a surrogate for the amount they talked. (The correlation between volunteering information and average words per answer was .87.) Judgments of intelligence were most strongly based on targets' high occupational prestige (mean r = .30), formality of dress (mean r = .30), lack of evasiveness (mean r = -.31), and short-response latency (mean r = -.24). Finally, deceptiveness judgments were most strongly influenced by the targets' youth (mean r = -.28), lack of smiling (mean r = -.28), volunteering little information (mean r --.23), and talking slowly (mean r = -.21).
In the introduction, we argued on theoretical grounds that judges' self-awareness would be limited by the degree to which researchers had asked them about the major influences on their judgments. Data support this argument. The correlation between the percentage of variance in one 1 The variance explained for the means of judges' person-perception judgments is higher than those reported above because of the greater reliability of means over individual judgments: mean R 2 = .72, intelligence = .67, friendliness = .79, and deceptiveness = .69. These compare favorably to the variance that the main effects of Nisbett and Bellows' (1977) experimental manipulations explained: mean R 2 = .11, liking = .03, sympathy = .05, intelligence = .24, and flexibility = .13. perceiver's judgments, explained by the 18 traveler characteristics, and that perceiver's self-awareness correlation is r(94) = .32, p < .005.
Is There Self-Awareness?
Our preliminary questions, based on Nisbett and Wilson's null hypothesis, were whether judges could accurately assess the influences on their judgments and whether their accuracy could be entirely duplicated by nonparticipant observers who had made no judgments. Our basic strategy was to estimate the extent of a judge's self-awareness and then to subtract liberal estimates of nonintrospective processes that could lead to self-awareness. Tables 2 and 3 provide the relevant data. Table 2 indicates for each of the three person-perception judgments the mean actual impact of the stimulus characteristics on the person-perception judgments; the mean subjective impact, as estimated by the judges; and the lay theories about the impact, as estimated by the observer subjects. In Table 2 all values have been standardized to transform them to a common scale. Thus, a 0 indicates that the characteristic had no actual impact or was estimated to have no impact, a 1 indicates that the characteristic had a standard deviation more impact in the positive direction than did other characteristics, and a -1 indicates that it had a standard deviation more impact in the negative direction than did other characteristics. (Note that Table 2 is designed only to summarize data; it was not used in any analyses.) Table 3 shows for each person-perception judgment the mean correlations representing self-awareness; the adequacy of the lay theories in explaining the self-awareness; the accuracy of the lay theories in predicting actual impact; and the accuracy of the selfawareness, when lay theories are held constant.
Over all, the mean of the self-awareness correlation was substantially greater than zero (mean r = .42, SD = .18), f(95) = 22.86, p< 10~9). Judges who made friendliness judgments (mean r = .52) were more accurate at assessing the influences on their judgments than were those who made deception judgments (mean r = .39) and intelligence judgments (mean r = .36), F(2, 90) = 6.28, p < .003. Ninety-thr,ee of the 96 correlations representing judges' self- Note. Entries have been transformed at the subject level by dividing each original score by its column standard deviation so that a 0 indicates a cue had no impact, a +1 indicates the cue had a standard deviation more impact in the positive direction than other cues (i.e., more of the cue means more of the judgment), and a -1 indicates the cue had a standard deviation more impact in the negative direction than other cues (i.e., more of the cue means less of the judgment).
awareness were positive. Clearly, judges were able to assess the impact of stimulus characteristics on their judgments at far beyond chance levels. Nisbett and Wilson's claim, however, is that any accuracy judges show in assessing the influence on their judgments could be reproduced by outside observers who made no judgments. Thus we need to ask whether judges were able to assess the influence on their judgments beyond predictions based on lay theories of causation, that is, observers' guesses about how they would have been influenced. The mean self-awareness partial correlation, holding observers' estimates constant, is the most direct test of this hypothesis. The mean of this partial correlation is reliably above zero. (Mean partial r = .15, SD = .18), t(95) = 8.16, p < l<r 7 . Seventytwo of these 96 partial correlations were positive. These partial correlations indicate that judges' self-awareness cannot totally be predicted from lay theories. Considering the person-perception judgments separately, this was the case for deceptiveness, t(3l) = 6.91, p < .001, and intelligence, f(31) = 2.68, p < p<.01, but not for friendliness, f(31) = 1.40, p> .10.
A critic might argue that outside observers were disadvantaged because they did not see the stimuli on which person-perception judgments were based. A more stringent test showing that judges know what influences them better than do other people compares Note. N -32 for each judgment.
the accuracy with which a judge's subjective impact estimates account for the actual impact on his or her own judgments rather than the actual impact on another judge. We call the correlation of the actual impact on judge A's judgments with a randomly selected judge B's subjective impact estimate a mismatched accuracy correlation. As with the self-awareness partial correlations, comparing the mismatched accuracy correlation to the introspective accuracy correlation controls for the judge's and the outsider observer's use of common a priori theories about likely influences on behavior. In addition this comparison of the two correlations controls for their access to the same stimulus materials and their performance of the same judgment task. To the extent that two judges who make the same type of judgment are influenced by different characteristics of the stimuli (i.e., they have different decision rules), a judge's subjective impact estimates should predict the actual impact on his or her judgments better than it would predict the actual impact on another judge's judgments. Of course, the more similar the two decision rules, the higher the mismatched correlations. Overall, the similarity between decision rules was impressively high (mean r = .62), being higher for friendliness judgments (r = .76) and intelligence judgments (mean r = .63) than for deceptiveness judgments (mean r = .46). However, because there is enough individual variability in decision rules, one can determine whether people are better able to understand what influences their own judgments than are very similar outsiders.
We computed the mismatched correlations by pairing the actual impact weights for one judge with a randomly selected other judge's subjective impact weights. The mean of the mismatched accuracy correlations was .36, which was significantly lower than the mean introspective accuracy correlation of .42, K95) = 2.43, p < .01. The mean partial self-awareness correlation, controlling for the mismatched judgments, was .15 (p < 10~6), showing that self-awareness remains even when the judgments of similar judges performing a similar task were held constant.
The estimates of self-awareness that we have produced are minimum estimates, and we believe that judges know what influences their person-perception judgments far better than our data reflect. Among the methodological reasons for this belief are the following: First, as we have stressed, the assessment of self-awareness is limited by how completely and accurately researchers have identified the true sources of influence on a behavior, belief, or decision. Although the cues that we selected explain a substantial amount of the variance in a substantial proportion of subjects' judgments, we obviously have not explained it all. Our cues failed to explain a significant percentage of the variation in person-perception judgments for 41 of 96 subjects. Over all judges, the 18 cues left an average of 45% of the variance unexplained.
In addition if we were wrong in specifying the actual influences on the person-perception judgments, this failure would lower the self-awareness correlation. This would hap-pen, for example, if we asked judges about a cue that did not influence judgments but was correlated with a true influence, or if we asked them about a cue that had a nonlinear effect on the judgments. Similarly, any inconsistency between the way in which we operationalized a cue and the way in which a judge interpreted our description of it would also lower the self-awareness correlation.
Finally, for reasons of reliability, the selfawareness correlation is relatively deflated, whereas the components subtracted from it to remove the effects of the lay theories are relatively inflated. This is because a judge's estimate of a cue's impact is based on a single estimate per judge and is, therefore, likely to be unreliable, whereas the lay theory about a cue's impact is based on a mean of 12 observers' estimates and has a mean reliability averaged over the three personperception judgments of .92 (Cronbach alpha). The result of this discrepancy in reliabilities is to lower estimates of a judge's self-awareness, especially when lay theories of impact are held constant.
Thus, several colleagues have mentioned that in Table 3 , the lay theories seem to predict the influences on a judge's judgments (mean r -.48) better than the judge's own introspections (mean r = .42). This is an artifact of discrepancies in reliabilities. Because we had judges make only one set of subjective impact estimates, we could not correct correlations for attenuation due to their unreliability. Therefore, to compare the accuracy of subjective impact estimates and the lay theory estimates, we recomputed Table 3 by randomly matching each judge with a Single lay theorist. This reanalysis, as expected, lowers the accuracy of the lay theory (mean r = .35) and the adequacy of the lay theories to account for introspections (mean r = .48) and raises the self-awareness partial correlation (mean r = .31).
Influences on Self-Awareness
Introspection. Up to this point, our aim has been to test the null hypothesis that people have no private knowledge about what influences them. We have shown that it is wrong. However, judges do not achieve their self-awareness completely through introspection. Rather we think that judges combine several sources of information derived from different psychological processes to form these beliefs. We will discuss several of these processes and attempt, using data and argument, to weigh the importance of each. The first of these processes is, of course, introspection, by which we mean simply the private access to the decisionmaking process before the final decision and the overt behavior that communicates it to others. Because a researcher has no independent access to a judge's introspections, operationally, accurate introspection can be thought of as a residual process whose existence as a cause is established to the extent that other plausible causes have been eliminated.
A priori theories. The second source of information from which judges can derive their subjective impact estimates is the a priori theories that we have discussed above about likely influences on judgments. Column 3 in Table 3 shows that the lay theories can indeed account well for judges' subjective impact estimates (mean r = .65). But these a priori lay theories themselves can be of two sorts. First, they may represent general cultural knowledge that is either explicit (e.g., "You can tell if someone is lying by looking in his eyes") or implicit (e.g., the vague feeling that the rich have more of all good qualities), and they can be either accurate or inaccurate. This is the sort of a priori theory that Nisbett and his colleagues have presented as an alternative to introspection.
On the other hand, a priori theories may themselves be a result of a judge's history of accurate introspections. All of our subjects have made thousands of person-perception judgments in their daily lives that are similar to those examined in this research. Indeed, intelligence and friendliness were chosen as target dimensions because of the frequency with which judgments about them are made every day. In computing the self-awareness partial correlation, We subtracted from the self-awareness correlation the degree to which judges' self-awareness could have been accounted for by the ac-curacy of observers who made no judgments. In doing so we were, to a degree, subtracting out the self-awareness that both judges and observers shared and thus underestimating the degree to which judges used introspection to determine what influenced them.
We have shown that judges' accuracy at knowing what influenced them, that is, the self-awareness correlations, cannot be totally accounted for by lay theories of likely impact. Yet the high correlation of the mean lay theory estimates with the mean subjective impact estimates, r(16) = .73,/>< .005, implies that they form a partial basis for judges' beliefs about what influenced them. The increase an this correlation, when one controls for the actual impact of the cues on judgments, partial r(15) = .87, p< .001, suggests that the lay theories are especially able to account for the inaccuracy in judges' assessments of impact.
Covariation detection. Through introspection, judges could be aware of what influenced a single judgment as well as what influenced a series of judgments. However, researchers cannot determine the cause of a single judgment. To establish what actually influenced judges' person-perception judgments, we had them make a series of such judgments. Nisbett and Ross (1980) have argued that with this sort of experimental design, at least part of the accuracy in judges' self-awareness can come from their detection of the covariation between their judgments and the characteristics of the stimuli they are judging. This covariation detection could as easily have been done^by an outside observer, and therefore they claim that it is not true introspection.
However, for several reasons, we are skeptical of this accounting for the accuracy in judges' self-awareness. First, as Nisbett and Ross have also stressed, people are poor assessors of covariation (e.g., Ross, 1977) . Thus, it is unreasonable to think that the judges could keep in mind their judgments about 50 travelers and the numerous characteristics on which travelers varied (far more than the 18 cues that we measured) in order to compute implicitly and accurately the 18 influences about which we asked them. They could not do this if they were confronted with the barren 19 X 50 matrix of numbers from which we computed the self-awareness correlations.
We did not conduct the interpersonal simulation control group (Bern, 1965) , which an explicit examination of the covariation-detection hypothesis would require, because we believed simulator subjects would themselves have used introspection to perform this task. For example, if we had shown them videotaped excerpts followed by a judge's person-perception judgments, it is likely that they would have estimated how stimulus characteristics influenced the judge by making the person perception themselves or otherwise putting themselves in the perspective of the judge (Regan & Totten, 1975) . In either case they would have access to their own introspections or their reconstructions of the original judge's decision process.
One way judges may have made subjective-impact estimates based on covariation detection would have been to use one of several instance-based heuristics as an aid. We asked judges to tell us how they made their subjective-impact estimates. Because these questions asked for judges' introspections on the process of introspecting, we present the data here with trepidation. Judges rated (on 6-point scales, where 1 meant not at all and 6 meant very much) the extent to which they used^ each of two instance-based strategies ("Recalled a few specific travelers who were extreme on the dimension you judged and then tried to remember their behavior" and "Recalled . . . travelers who were extreme on the behaviors or cues asked about and then tried to remember the ratings you gave them") and a gestalt-based strategy ("Tried ,to judge in general how the cues related to the dimension you judged"). Subjects said that they used the gestalt-based strategy (M = 4.7) more than the instance-based strategy: extreme judgment (M = 3.1) and extreme behavior (M = 3.8); for the maximum, t(77) = 2.65, p< 0.1. More interesting is the finding that the more the judges used a gestalt-based rather than an instancebased strategy, the higher their self-awareness of what influenced them, r(77) = .21, p < .07. This is a tentative finding, then, that truly introspective judgments lead to greater self-awareness.
Strategy-driven judgments.
A critic might argue that a mechanism by which judges may show self-awareness is to let their beliefs about what should influence them shape what actually influences them. In the extreme, for example, judges may have decided to rate all smiling people as friendly in order to be accurate when they reported that smiling influenced their judgments.
However, we believe that the judges' focus on the process of making a person-perception judgment had little influence on the judgments they made. For example, the actual impact weights for the 18 cues based on the mean deceptiveness judgments in the present experiment were very similar to the actual impact weights based on the mean decision to search travelers, as was done in Kraut and Poe's study in which subjects were not asked to introspect, r(16) = .76, p<.00001. In addition, Ericsson and Simon (1980) have shown that focusing subjects' attention on their cognitive processes does not change the content of the processes much, although it makes those processes slower.
Delay. A next step in this research is not to argue about the degree of judges' selfawareness but to identify the occasions on which they will be accurate or inaccurate. Ericsson and Simon (1980) have developed a theoretical model to this end. Their model emphasizes access to short-term memory as mental processing is occurring. Following both them and White (1980), we had expected that self-awareness would decrease as more time intervened between judges' making a person-perception judgment and their reporting on what influenced it. If judges were basing their self-reports on introspection, these introspections would be less vivid and accurate as time and other tasks intervened.
Half of the judges gave subjective-impact estimates immediately after judging all 50 travelers and half gave these estimates after completing a filler task. Although the selfawareness correlation was smaller following delay (mean r = .45 vs. .40), this drop was not significant, F(l, 90) = 1.55, p < .20.
These weak effects for delay may have occurred because judges had already delayed in reporting on their introspections while aggregating them over 50 judgments or because they were using other processes in addition to introspection to produce their subjective-impact estimates. In any case our work shows that a person's awareness of the influences on his or her social judgments is available in long-term memory as long as 30 minutes after the judgment and following the performance of a potentially interfering task.
Cue type. For what sorts of cues do judges have self-awareness? Many people believe that nonverbal cues have their influence on person-perception judgments via judges' intuitions, that is to say, outside of their awareness. To examine this possibility, we subdivided the cues into static cues (age, sex, occupational prestige, attractiveness, formal dress, and height), visual, nonverbal cues (postural stiffness, smiles, gestures, head nods, postural shifts, eye contact, and grooming), and semantic and paralinguistic cues (formality of prose, evasiveness, volunteering information, speech rate, and response latency). We then computed three self-awareness correlations for each judge, in which the correlations were based on an N of 6, 7, and 5 cues, respectively. These self-awareness correlations were the input to a judgment (friendliness, deceptiveness, and intelligence) by cue type (static, nonverbal, semantic/paralinguistic) analysis of variance, with cue type as a within-subject factor.
The results are displayed in Table 4 . Judges' accuracy at assessing the influences on their judgments depended on the type of cue they were assessing, F(2, 186) = 8.91, p < .0005, and on the cue type by judgment interaction. Post hoc t tests showed that judges were better at assessing the impact of paralinguistic and semantic cues than they were at assessing the influence of either the fleeting nonverbal behaviors the targets performed, f(93) = 4.24, p < .001, or their static characteristics, t(93) = 2.66, p < .01. Accuracy at assessing the impact of nonverbal and static cues did not differ, t(93) = 1.46. The interaction between judgment and cue type, however, complicates this picture, F(4, 186) ==34.4, /x.OOOl. Judges were especially poor at assessing how static cues influenced their judgments of friendliness and how nonverbal cues influenced their judgments of intelligence. It is unclear whether these results reflect the differential attention judges pay to cues when making different judgments or whether they are an artifact of the low impact certain cues had on certain judgments.
Conclusion
In summary, we have shown that people have a moderate amount of knowledge about the factors influencing their judgments of other people. Our data and the parallel research by White (1980) render highly implausible the null hypothesis that people have no introspective awareness about their higher order cognitive processes. We have shown that a judge's self-report about what influenced him or her predicts the actual influences on his or her judgments beyond weights derived from lay theories about what should influence their judgments, that is, observers' estimates of impact, and beyond weights derived from other people making the same person-perception judgment, that is, the mismatched correlations.
Yet people are not totally accurate about knowing what influences them, and their self-awareness is not totally a result of introspection. They also rely on their a priori beliefs about what are likely influences on their judgments and, perhaps, on the observation of the covariation between their responses and characteristics of a stimulus.
Determining the relative importance of these sources of information is, however, a complex and difficult task. For example, although a priori theories may strongly mediate people's self-awareness, these theories may themselves be the result of a history of accurate introspection. The difficulty of this task is not helped by all-or-nothing claims.
